ASclep. What part therefore of the world do the fates abide in, O Trismegistus? If the Heavenly Gods beare universal rule, do the earthly Gods which we call Fortune and Fate inhabite in particular places?
Trism. O Asclepius, that is the necessity of all things that are governed, that they are alwayes joyned and lincked together: this is therefore the efficient cause of things, or the most high God, or next unto God, which second effect is God, or the discipline, of all earthly and Heavenly things, stablished by divine p. 120 lawes. These therefore, Fortune and Necessity, are both tyed together by an individuall knot. The former of which, Fortune or Fate, begets the beginning of all things, but Necessity enforceth them to their effects, which depends from those beginnings. Order, followeth these, which is the continuance, and disposition of time in bringing things to passe, for nothing is without the agreement of Order. In all these this world is perfit, for the world it self is carried by Order, or consisteth wholly of Order: wherefore these 3. Fate, Necessity, and Order, are brought to passe, especially by the will of God, who governeth the world by his own Law and divine reason. By these therefore both will and nill are by a divine hand fully crossed; for they are neither moved by anger, p. 121 nor bowed by favour, but serve the necessity of eternall reason, which Eternity is unchangeable, immoveable, and insoluble. Fate therefore is the first; which, the seed being as it were cast in, receives the encrease of all future things. Necessity follows, by which all things are enforced violently to their effects. The Third is Order, which preserveth the frame of those things which Fate and Necessity hath disposed of. This is therefore eternity, which neither hath beginning nor ending, which by a fixed immutable law of continuall motion is preserved. It riseth and falls oftentimes by course, so that when the times vary, it riseth again in those same parts in which it fell, for so is reason a voluble rotundity that all are so firmely joyned that you cannot p. 122 know what is the beginning of volubility, when all things seem to go before, and follow themselves, for chance and fortune are mixed in all worldly things.
The Commentary.
The fourteenth Chapter speaketh of the Destinies, which he calleth Fate, Necessity, and Order; others, Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos. About which the Ethnicks were not wont lesse to trifle, than about other gods, which they feigned unto themselves, coyning new and wonder-working Deities: but Mercurius treats of these more briefly and sparingly, and (as it were) doubtfully, like as these three should be the determination, and predestination of the Divine Will; which Necessity of things, as they p. 123 be, follows; which lastly Order preserves, even as it is stablished by Divine and Eternall Law: So that the first Fate is Divine Predestination; the second, Consequence of things; and the third, Preservation. And these three, or the Divine Law, or those things that follow the course of Divine Law, contein the order both of finite causes, and those which are according to nature, but yet Fate admitteth in casuall things indefinite, and indeterminate causes beyond nature: but of these let others judge.
And this for this present part.